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by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 260-266. © 2001 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Do "prevailing wage laws" that
authorize state officials, without any
notice or hearing, to order the with-
holding of monies due a contractor
violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
FACTS
During 1995, Respondent, G & G
Fire Sprinklers, Inc. (hereinafter
G&G"), a fire protection company
that installs fire sprinkler systems,
contracted as a subcontractor with
certain prime contractors on certain
'.public works" projects with
California governmental agencies.
California, like many other states,
has adopted a "prevailing wage law"
(California Labor Code §§ 1720-
1861) applicable to public works
projects undertaken within its geo-
graphical boundaries. Under this
law, enacted in 1931, the state pays
a premium for construction work
done on public projects and, in con-
sideration of such premium,
requires all contractors working on
these projects to pay their employ-
ees "prevailing wages" in the con-
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struction industry. The prime con-
tractor agrees, in his contract with
the governmental entity, that its
construction workers, and the work-
ers of the subcontractors whom he
later selects to perform the con-
tract, will be paid prevailing wages.
California law mandates that the
prevailing wage requirement be
incorporated into and become a
part of the contract. The govern-
mental awarding body is required to
withhold funds otherwise due to the
prime contractor where there are
violations of the prevailing wage
requirement so that this money can
be held for, and eventually paid to,
the affected workers.
Each of the prime contractors that
subcontracted work to G&G on
these projects was accordingly
required by law to agree to the fol-
lowing contractual provisions in
their public works contracts with
the respective public awarding bod-
ies: (1) that prevailing wages would
be paid to all workers employed on
the project, whether by the prime
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contractor or its subcontractors,
(2) that certified payroll records
would be kept and provided to the
Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement (hereinafter "DLSE")
upon request, showing the hours
worked and wages paid to all work-
ers employed on the project by the
prime contractor and its subcon-
tractors, and (3) that the public
agencies that had awarded the con-
tracts could withhold contract pay-
ments to these prime contractors to
cover unpaid wages and penalties if
the agreements were breached. The
California Labor Code provides vari-
ous enforcement mechanisms for
violations of the prevailing wage
laws. A violation may give rise to
criminal penalties, administrative
debarment, civil penalties, and lia-
bility for wage underpayments. The
Labor Code provides for the pay-
ment of the civil penalties and wage
claims from the money that
becomes due under the public
works contract.
The Notice to Withhold is a proce-
dure used by DLSE to enforce the
prevailing wage provisions of the
Labor Code. The Notice to Withhold
is a statutory seizure order issued
by DLSE to an awarding body. The
seizure is made without any notice
or hearing. The Notice to Withhold
seizes payments as they become
due under the contract. The Notice
to Withhold sets forth the civil
penalties assessed by DLSE and the
alleged wage claims asserted by
DLSE. The Notice to Withhold iden-
tifies the subcontractor, if any,
alleged to have violated the Labor
Code. The awarding body is ordered
to remit the money seized to DLSE,
unless the contractor files a lawsuit
pursuant to the Labor Code. If a
lawsuit is filed, the money is held by
the awarding body, as a stakeholder,
pending completion of the lawsuit,
including exhaustion of all appellate
rights. The lawsuit is the exclusive
remedy, and no other issue may be
included in the action. The award-
ing body has a mandatory duty
under the Labor Code to comply
with the Notice to Withhold. A
refusal to comply with the Notice to
Withhold can be a crime.
After allegedly discovering certain
prevailing wage law violations by
G&G, i.e., the failure to pay prevail-
ing wages concerning three separate
projects undertaken by G&G, DLSE
issued notices to the awarding bod-
ies to withhold contract payments
from the prime contractors on these
projects. Following receipt of the
notices to withhold from DLSE, the
awarding bodies for each of the pro-
jects withheld money from the
prime contractors. The prime con-
tractors, in turn, withheld from
G&G payments allegedly otherwise
due under their subcontractors
"on account of G&G's failure to
comply" with the prevailing wage
requirements.
After the prime contractors with-
held from G&G, G&G brought this
action for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 in the
United States District Court for the
Central District of California. G&G
claimed that the issuance of the
notices to withhold by the state
without a prior hearing constituted
a deprivation of property without
due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The state responded with a motion
to dismiss, and G&G filed a motion
for summary judgment. The district
court denied the state's motion to
dismiss and granted G&G's motion
for summary judgment. The district
court's judgment declared various
sections of the California Labor
Code unconstitutional and enjoined
the state from enforcing those
statutes against G&G. Petitioners
filed a timely notice of appeal from
this judgment.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's judgment, with a
modification. G & G Fire
Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 156
F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth
Circuit agreed that the Notice to
Withhold procedure was unconstitu-
tional but concluded that the
statutes need not be declared
unconstitutional on their face. The
Ninth Circuit held that the statutes
were unconstitutional as applied.
The Ninth Circuit opined that the
constitutional defect could be reme-
died by the adoption of regulations
that provided for a pre-deprivation
or prompt post-deprivation hearing.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the contractor's right to file a law-
suit under California's Labor Code
did not satisfy the requirements of
due process.
Upon a Petition for Rehearing by
DLSE, the Ninth Circuit modified its
opinion to state that a post-depriva-
tion hearing would be sufficient (as
opposed to requiring a pre-depriva-
tion hearing). G & G Fire
Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 156
F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1998).
Subsequently, the Supreme Court
vacated the Ninth Circuit opinion
for reconsideration in light of
American Manufacturer's Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S.
40 (1999). Bradshaw v. G & G Fire
Sprinklers, Inc., 526 U.S. 1061
(1999). Mter reconsideration, the
Ninth Circuit issued an order rein-
stating its prior opinion, without
modification. G & G Fire Sprinklers
,'. Bradshaw, 204 F.3d 941 (9th Cir.
20(.00). Thereafter, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Lujan cv. G
& G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 121 S.Ct.
297 (U.S. Oct 10, 2000).
CASE ANALYSIS
Where state action is an issue, the
inquiry must begin with the thresh-
old principle that § 1983 "excludes
from its reach merely private con-
(Continued on Page 262)
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duct, no matter how discriminatory
or wrongful." Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,
50 (1999). Under this basic tenet of
law, the federal courts have no juris-
diction over a § 1983 action unless
the plaintiff can plead and prove
"state action." The issue of state
action under § 1983 has often been
litigated in the federal courts. The
result is that several well-estab-
lished principles have emerged. For
example, the fact that a business is
subject to state regulation does not
convert its action into that of the
state for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Blumn v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1981). It is also clear that
a plaintiff seeking relief under
§ 1983 must affirmatively show "a
sufficiently close nexus" between
the state and the challenged action
so that "the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself."
Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004. Finally, the
state can be held responsible for pri-
vate action "only when it has exer-
cised coercive power or has provid-
ed significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice
must in law be deemed that of the
state." Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149 (1978).
Petitioner DLSE asserts that the dis-
trict court was without jurisdiction
because the deprivation of property
complained of was not pursuant to
state action as recently defined by
the Supreme Court in Sullivan. In
Sullivan, the respondents attacked
on due process grounds a
Pennsylvania statute that autho-
rized private insurers, without a
hearing, to withhold medical bene-
fits in workers' compensation cases
where the insurer submitted a form
to the state contesting the reason-
ableness or necessity of the treat-
ment provided. It was argued that
the insurers could not withhold
those benefits without a hearing. It
was also argued that the withholding
of the medical payments pursuant
to the Pennsylvania statute consti-
tuted state action within the mean-
ing of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Supreme Court rejected all of
respondents' arguments and
expressly held that the withholding
by the insurers was not state action.
Petitioner believes that when the
operative facts in this case are com-
pared with those in Sullivan, they
are strikingly similar. In Sullivan, as
here, the state law authorized a pri-
vate business to withhold funds
under certain conditions. The insur-
ers in Sullivan were permitted to
withhold payment if they suspected
that the treatment provided by the
physician or other care giver was
not reasonable or necessary, and
they filed a form with the state to
that effect. Here, the prime contrac-
tors are permitted to withhold pay-
ment due a subcontractor if they
believe the subcontractor has failed
to comply with prevailing wage
obligations.
In both cases the applicable statute
does not mandate withholding by
the regulated party, it only permits
it. The decision whether or not to
withhold is in the ultimate discre-
tion of the private party, not the
sovereign. Therefore, as in Sullivan,
the state's decision to allow the
prime contractors to withhold pay-
ment can just as easily be seen as
state inaction. Petitioner asserts
that all the statute does here is to
provide a remedy to the prime con-
tractor for violations of the prevail-
ing wage law. The state of California
does not mandate utilization of this
remedy any more than the state of
Pennsylvania mandated withholding
in Sullivan. The teaching of
Sullivan is unequivocal-the pri-
vate use of state-sanctioned private
remedies does not rise to the level
of state action.
Moreover, petitioner contends that
there is no evidence before the
Court to show that the action of the
private entity complained of was the
result of either the "coercive power"
or "significant encouragement" of
the state. The evidence, in fact, is
plainly to the contrary. The prime
contractor may indeed under the
particular circumstances prevailing
at the time find it in his business
interest to withhold funds from the
subcontractor, but he clearly need
not do so. Further, petitioner states
that the prime contractor will
receive no adverse response
from the state if he chooses not to
withhold.
In both this case and in Sullivan,
the last link in the chain of action is
a private one, requiring the exercise
of private discretion before the
determination is made whether to
withhold from the subcontractor or
not. The common and controlling
fact in both this case and Sullivan
is that the final act is entrusted to a
private party who can decide in its
sole discretion. The reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit is grounded on a mis-
conceived assumption, i.e., that the
prime contractor had no choice but
to continue the chain of conduct
initiated by the state and withhold
from the subcontractor. This per-
ception has no support in the
record and is plainly at variance
with the true circumstances. The
undisputed truth is that a prime
contractor in this situation has the
absolute discretion to either with-
hold or not. Therefore, G&G's claim
under section 1983 lacks the funda-
mental jurisdictional element of
state action.
Petitioner next argues that G&G's
pleadings have omitted essential
allegations necessary to maintain its
due process claim. G&G never
alleged the existence of any agree-
ments between itself and the prime
contractors, making it impossible to
determine what, if any, property
rights it possesses. Moreover, it has
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never made any kind of a showing
at any level that it was in compli-
ance with the prevailing wage law.
Finally, it has not alleged that it was
due the funds withheld by the prime
contractors because it had fully per-
formed its part of the contract. It
has never, in fact, even alleged any
entitlement to these funds. Clearly,
under Sullivan, G&G has fallen far
short of meeting its affirmative bur-
den as the moving party in its own
lawsuit. G&G has failed to plead
necessary elements sufficient to
show entitlement to the funds with-
held. Therefore, G&G has no basis
to assert a due process violation,
Petitioner also contends that G&G's
claim against the state pursuant to
its construction contract does not
constitute a "property right" for due
process purposes. While acknowl-
edging that the Supreme Court has
not had occasion to make a conclu-
sive determination with respect to
the property rights of contractors
performing public works for purpos-
es of due process, virtually all the
federal courts that have dealt with
the question have reached a single
conclusion. The federal courts have
unequivocally held that the scope of
due process rights does not extend
to these kinds of cases. The Second
Circuit in Martz v. Village of Valley
Stream, 22 F.3d 26 (2nd Cir. 1994),
held that purported rights existing
under ordinary construction and
supply contracts do not equate to
significant property interests pro-
tected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Likewise, the First
Circuit has held that a mere breach
of a contractual right is not a depri-
vation of property implicating due
process of law. Otherwise, virtually
every controversy involving an
alleged breach of contract with a
governmental institution or agency
or instrumentality would be a con-
stitutional case. Bleeker v. Dukakis,
665 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1981).
Also, the Seventh Circuit, in affirm-
ing the dismissal of a § 1983 action
brought by county employees for
breach of contract, cautioned that
there is reason to doubt whether the
Fourteenth Amendment was intend-
ed to allow every person with a
breach of contract claim against a
state to bring that claim in federal
Court. Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d
360 (7th Cir. 1983). Finally, the
Third Circuit has likewise observed
that if every breach of contract by
someone acting under color of state
law constituted a deprivation of
property for procedural due process
purposes, the federal courts would
be called upon to pass judgment on
the procedural fairness of a myriad
of contract claims against public
entities. Reich v. Behar,, 883 F.2d
239 (3rd Cir. 1989). The Ninth
Circuit's decision in this case is the
only circuit court decision to find
an enforceable property right under
the Fourteenth Amendment in a
garden-variety public works con-
tract dispute between a public
agency and a private contractor.
Petitioner notes that the Ninth
Circuit's decision finding a "proper-
ty right" is premised in large part on
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969). Petitioner,
however, asserts that Sniadach is
not a controlling authority.
Petitioner distinguishes Sniadach
on the basis that in Sniadach it was
the debtor's indisputable property
(his wages) that were seized. In this
case, G&G did not have an absolute
right to the funds because of a dis-
pute over compliance with a condi-
tion precedent to entitlement to the
funds-compliance with the prevail-
ing wage laws. Therefore, Sniadach
is not applicable in this case.
Petitioner further argues that state
law provides sufficient remedies to
satisfy the requirements of due
process. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, overruled in part on other
grounds by Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1981), the Supreme
Court recognized that post-depriva-
tion remedies made available by the
state can satisfy the due process
clause. Petitioner argues that there
are a number of state remedies
available to G&G. First, a subcon-
tractor involved in a public works
project in California who has had
funds withheld under the prevailing
wage law may request an assign-
ment of the prime contractor's
rights to bring a lawsuit against the
state under the Labor Code.
Second, a well-developed body of
case law in California invests the
subcontractor with comprehensive
remedies for breach of contract.
Third, a subcontractor may sue for
equitable subrogation and get a full
hearing on its claim to the withheld
funds. Equitable subrogation per-
mits the subcontractor to stand in
the shoes of the prime contractor
and obtain a full and fair hearing
under the California Labor Code.
In addition, the California
Legislature has created two distinct
statutory vehicles for subcontrac-
tors on public works projects to use
for prosecuting their claims to with-
held funds. The subcontractor is
empowered to proceed to recover
the withheld funds under both the
stop-notice procedures and the
payment-bond provisions of the
California Civil Code. In summary,
the routine nature of the depriva-
tion allegedly suffered by G&G ren-
ders it wholly compensable through
the aforementioned state post-depri-
vation remedies. These remedies
provide all the process that is due to
a contractor challenging the state's
withholding process.
Finally, petitioner posits that the
deprivation complained of by G&G
is "indirect" and therefore not pro-
tected by the due process clause.
For over a century, the Supreme
(Continued on Page 264)
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Court has recognized the principle
that the due process clause does not
apply to indirect adverse effects of
governmental action. Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall 457, 20 L.Ed. 287
(1870). The sole action taken by
petitioners, i.e., the issuance of
notices to withhold to the contract-
ing public bodies based on G&G's
noncompliance with the prevailing
wage law, was taken solely against
the prime contractors, who there-
after unilaterally chose to withhold
monies due G&G for work per-
formed under its subcontracts.
While the law allows the prime con-
tractor to deduct wages and penal-
ties from the subcontractor, the
decision is that of the prime con-
tractor, not the state. The mere
knowledge that an adverse impact
on third parties is likely to follow
from the enforcement of the law is
clearly not enough to constitute
direct action against the subcon-
tractor. Thus, the impact on G&G is
indirect and not protected by the
due process clause.
On the other hand, G&G asserts
that the pass-through of the seizure
from the prime contractor to a sub-
contractor is state action. In
Sullivan, the Court explained that a
private party's resort to the machin-
ery of the state to effect an ex parte
seizure of property is state action.
In this case, state action is thrust
upon a private party to effect an eAx
parte seizure to advance the regula-
tory purpose of the state. DLSE
speaks of the prime contractor's dis-
cretion to pay the subcontractor.
DLSE grants the prime contractor
discretion to absorb the loss from
DLSE's targeting of the subcontrac-
tor as an alleged violator of the
Labor Code, or alternately, the
prime contractor may accept the
role of DLSE's enforcement.
Significantly, the Labor Code grants
a safe harbor to the compliant
prime contractor. The net effect is
that the subcontractor bears the
burden of the civil penalties and
alleged wage claims by becoming
the subject of the seizure. The
prime contractor is enlisted by
DLSE in the transfer as a mere con-
duit-or at most, a joint partici-
pant-by the hammer of economic
compulsion. The prime contractor is
drafted into the fray only after
DLSE interjects itself into the con-
tractual relations of the project par-
ticipants, by seizing money due to
the prime contractor. DLSE identi-
fies the subcontractor as the alleged
violator of the Labor Code, thereby
rendering the prime contractor's
pass-through inevitable. The sub-
contractor's predicament is not the
result of judgments made by private
parties, but rather the subcontrac-
tor is directly in the crosshairs of a
proactive state enforcement agency.
State action is clearly manifest.
The respondents argue that, con-
trary to petitioner's assertion, G&G
suffered a direct injury from the
seizure of the prime contractor's
money due and, therefore, has
standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of that seizure. The injury
to G&G, as a subcontractor, from
the seizure of the prime contractor's
money due was a direct injury
caused by the DLSE. No other result
makes sense. The prime contractor
suffers no injury to the extent the
seizure is passed through to the sub-
contractor. Obviously, the seizure
causes an injury. If the prime
contractor is not injured, the
injury must be suffered by the
subcontractor.
The subcontractor's right to receive
monies due under its contract is a
"property interest" protected by the
due process clause. The Supreme
Court has held that a deprivation of
property occurs when an entitle-
ment grounded in state law is
removed. Logan v. Zimmerman,
455 U.S. 422 (1982). The subcon-
tractor's entitlement to money due
actually includes two property inter-
ests-a statutory right to receive
payment from the prime contrac-
tor's payment, and the old-fashioned
money due for work performed. The
Notice to Withhold terminates these
statutory entitlements. The targeted
subcontractor who is owed money
would be paid "but for" the seizure
of the prime contractor's payment
due. Clearly, significant property
rights of the subcontractor are being
affected by the state statute.
According to the respondent, setting
aside the subcontractor's property
interest in monies due, the seizure
of the prime contractor's money due
is a sufficient basis to declare the
statutory scheme violative of the
due process clause. The Notice to
Withhold seizes the prime contrac-
tor's right to receive money due
under the contract. The money is
paid, instead, into a fund to be used
for the payment of civil penalties
and wage claims. The seizure of the
prime contractor's right to receive
money due under the contract is a
deprivation of property. Vindicating
the prime contractor's right to a
hearing establishes that the proce-
dure is unconstitutional.
Respondent asserts that the Ninth
Circuit's decision striking down the
California statutory scheme is con-
sistent with the Sullivan decision.
Sullivan involved the denial of a
claim by a public insurance compa-
ny. The Court held that the mere
submission of a payment request did
not establish an entitlement to pay-
ment. This case addresses the situa-
tion where the payment request has
been approved, and the obligation to
pay has arisen. The question here is
Whether a seizure of the right to
receive the payment is a deprivation
of property. In Sullivan, the
enforcement officials did not seize
money due under the insurance pol-
icy for payment of civil penalties
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and third-party claims arising from
an alleged violation of law. Sullivan
did not involve money due, civil
penalties, third-party claims, or reg-
ulatory enforcement action.
Sullivan did not involve termina-
tion of an entitlement. Instead,
Sullivan involved classic propri-
etary conduct by a public entity. An
employer could purchase insurance
from the private insurer or the pub-
lic insurer. This case is the flip side
of the Sullivan coin. Sullivan
involved the denial of a claim by an
insurance company. A due process
violation did not arise merely
because the insurer was a public
company. In this case, DLSE's
enforcement action would require
due process if a private project were
involved. The mere fact that the
project owner may be a public com-
pany does not eliminate the need
for due process.
Respondent refutes petitioner's
assertion that adequate state law
remedies exist to address a state's
improper withholding of monies
due. The right of a contractor to sue
does not address the deprivation.
The deprivation here is the seizure
of money pending the final determi-
nation of such a lawsuit. The "tem-
porary" seizure can be devastating
in its effect. The release of the
money seized, years later, does not
remedy the injury suffered by cut-
ting off a contractor's cash flow. The
Supreme Court requires notice and
a hearing for such a "temporary
seizure."
In a lawsuit to recover monies
seized by a Notice to Withhold, the
contractor has the burden of proof.
DLSE is not required, at any time,
to establish that adequate grounds
existed for the issuance of the
Notice to Withhold. A contractor's
money may be held for years, even
if it is ultimately determined that
DLSE did not have legitimate
grounds to issue the Notice to
Withhold. The procedure provides
tremendous leverage for enforce-
ment officials that could be mis-
used. Excessive and improper
seizures can be used to compel a
contractor to accept demands not
justified by the facts or law. The
power of the enforcement officials
must be constrained by due process.
Generally, the Court balances sever-
al factors when considering what
process is due: (1) the private inter-
est involved, (2) the governmental
interest, (3) any administrative bur-
den, and (4) the risk of an erro-
neous decision. Consideration of
these factors in this case establishes
that the right to the state remedies
is not adequate process for the
seizure. The private interest in this
case is substantial. First, the failure
to provide a prompt hearing causes
substantial harm to an important
private interest. Cutting off the cash
flow to a contractor causes substan-
tial injury and can even force the
contractor out of business. Second,
the government's interest is not
affected by a hearing. The govern-
ment's interest is in enforcing the
Labor Code. A hearing to determine
probable validity does not conflict
with that governmental interest.
Certainly, the state has no legiti-
mate interest in the baseless seizure
of money. Third, a right to a hearing
would impose no administrative
burden. The hearing would only
serve to weed out claims that lack
merit. Finally, the risk of error is
substantial with a Notice to
Withhold. The risk of erroneous
deprivation is high where the under-
lying determination involves factual
disputes. The determination to
resolve reported prevailing wage vio-
lations generally involves hotly con-
tested factual disputes. Therefore,
there is great risk of an erroneous
deprivation.
Finally, respondent notes that peti-
tioner's brief for the first time
reveals legislative changes sched-
uled to take effect in July 2001.
Respondent believes that these leg-
islative changes should not affect
the judgment in this case. The judg-
ment in this case remains as vital as
ever, even if the legislative changes
take effect. This case is not moot. It
is well settled that a defendant's vol-
untary cessation of a challenged
practice does not deprive a federal
court of its power to determine the
legality of the practice. City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455
U.S. 283 (1982). Also, a case and
controversy exist as to G&G's award
of attorney fees under the current
statute, and as to pending proceed-
ings under the current law. Finally,
the statutes provide that DLSE shall
adopt regulations to implement the
statutes. It is important that DLSE
do so in the context of a judgment
declaring that due process concerns
must be honored.
SIGNIFICANCE
There are two predicates to an
action under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment-
state action and a sufficient proper-
tv interest warranting protection.
Both issues are in play in this case.
State action cases generally involve
some direct action against the per-
son claiming a constitutional viola-
tion. The California "prevailing
wage" statute is directed at the
prime contractors, but the ultimate
impact is visited upon the subcon-
tractors, whose monies are with-
held. Will the Supreme Court
extend the state action doctrine to
cover the derivative impact upon a
third party?
In addition to state action, a due
process violation further requires a
showing that one has been deprived
of his or her property without due
process of law. In this case, the
property question has two distinct
(Continued on Page 266)
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facets. First, the circuits are split on
whether a contractor who performs
work under a contract, and thereby
becomes entitled to payment, has a
cognizable property interest protect-
ed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
And second, can a property interest
(the contractual right to payment)
exist before all conditions precedent
to that right to payment have been
fulfilled? In this case, compliance
with the "prevailing wage laws" is
argued to be a condition precedent
to any monies due under the con-
struction contract. These are impor-
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